Rethinking the Reset — India–U.S. Defence Partnership and the Limits of Strategic Autonomy

By Sanjeev Oak

India’s renewal of its 10-year defense framework with the U.S. marks a new phase in strategic cooperation — deeper, more technological, and geopolitically charged. Yet beneath this embrace lies a sharper dilemma: how to gain military strength from America without surrendering the essence of India’s strategic autonomy.

“Partnerships must expand options, never foreclose them.”

The renewal of the India–U.S. defence framework for another decade is a watershed in bilateral relations. It codifies what has already become reality: sustained operational cooperation, deeper technology conversations and converging maritime interests. But the signature is only the beginning. The real questions are structural: How does India extract capability without ceding choice? Can New Delhi accelerate defence industrialisation without becoming captive to one supplier? And how will India manage the diplomatic friction that inevitably follows closer military integration with a superpower?

Historical context matters

Strategic autonomy is not an abstract slogan; it is the product of a century-long foreign-policy habit. India’s non-alignment and insistence on independent decision-making in procurement were born of small-state caution and the imperative to avoid entangling commitments. Over time, however, this very independence produced capability ceilings: delayed modernisation, fractured logistics, and dependence on legacy Russian systems.

The current framework renewal is therefore a corrective to capability gaps. It is driven by geopolitics — China’s maritime assertiveness, fragile neighbourhoods, and the high premium on advanced ISR, missile defence and sustainment logistics. Yet a corrective must not become a substitute for the original doctrine. Autonomy is not preserved by rhetoric; it is secured by industrial depth, procurement diversity and diplomatic dexterity.

“Strategic autonomy is not the absence of partners — it is the presence of alternatives.”

The industrial dilemma: access vs. absorption

The central promise of U.S. engagement is technology: engines, sensors, software, and production processes. For a country that wants to scale defence exports and indigenise production, access to U.S. supply chains is transformational. But access is not absorption. The history of technology transfer shows a recurring pattern: export control strictures, intellectual-property restrictions, and uneven transfer of “know-how.”

If India’s industry is to convert collaboration into capability, policy must bridge three gaps:

1. Design competence: Joint production must move beyond licence assembly to R&D partnerships that put Indian engineers at the centre.
2. Supplier base: The private sector needs predictable order books and technology roadmaps, not one-off contracts.
3. Standards and testing: Indian quality standards must be upgraded to meet Western requirements, including regulatory, certification and sustainment ecosystems.

Without these, the framework risks producing hardware with foreign brains and Indian hands — short-term jobs, long-term dependency.

Operational interoperability and logistics: freedom to operate

Deeper cooperation brings practical benefits: common doctrine in logistics, prepositioning of spares, basing collaborations, and shared ISR. But interoperability is a two-edged sword. Tactical alignment can translate into strategic expectations. For instance, docking rights, port access and information sharing create networks that can be politically awkward when New Delhi chooses a different geopolitical tempo.

India must therefore institutionalise reciprocity: any logistics or basing arrangement should be accompanied by clauses that protect New Delhi’s discretion and provide explicit carve-outs for sensitive scenarios. Interoperability should increase operational freedom, not constrain diplomatic choice.

“Interoperability must be a tool of autonomy, not its erosion.”

Diplomatic arithmetic: Russia, China and the rest

India’s defence calculus has never been binary. Russia remains a source of platforms, spares and a geopolitical counterweight. Simultaneously, European, Israeli and domestic suppliers fill niche needs. The new framework will increase pressure to prioritise U.S. systems; the question is whether that pressure will be direct or structural.

The risk is strategic (over-reliance on a single supplier), reputational (being perceived as a U.S. client in certain capitals), and operational (misaligned logistics in conflict contingencies involving Russian systems). India’s diplomatic skill must turn this into an advantage: use U.S. cooperation to leapfrog capabilities while keeping parallel supply chains alive.

Technology, law and finance: hidden chokepoints

Two non-military domains will determine success: export controls and finance. U.S. ITAR-style controls and restrictions on dual-use technologies can throttle projects unless negotiated in advance. Equally, access to favourable financing for co-production and insurance for joint ventures will matter. If Indian firms cannot secure project finance or face excessive compliance costs, the partnership will stall at the threshold of production.

Scenario planning: three futures

It helps to imagine three plausible trajectories.

1. Best case — Managed Complementarity: India leverages U.S. technology for high-value niches (engines, avionics), scales its indigenous base for mass production, and keeps Russia and others as complementary suppliers. Exports rise, capability gaps close, autonomy preserved.
2. Middle case — Capability Gain, Political Cost: India obtains advanced systems but increasingly aligns doctrine with U.S. operational habits. Diplomatic frictions with Russia and some neighbours intensify, requiring diplomatic repair and hedging.
3. Worst case — Dependency Trap: Rapid procurement of U.S. systems without concurrent industrialisation leads to high sustainment costs, limited local value-addition, and constrained policy choices in crises where U.S. interests differ.

India must plan for all three and design policies to bias outcomes toward the first.

Policy prescriptions: from intent to architecture

1. Industrial conditionalities: Any major U.S. transfer should be tied to enforceable technology-transfer milestones and onshore R&D commitments. Create a “technology escrow” mechanism for critical components and IP pathways.
2. Procurement diversification target: Limit single-supplier dependence by imposing a ceiling on any single country’s share of new procurement over rolling five-year windows.
3. Strategic sovereign funds: Create a fund to finance joint projects with predictable long-term capital, reducing dependence on commercial bank appetites and ensuring favourable credit lines for Indian co-manufacturers.
4. Legal safeguards: Build explicit provisions on basing, logistics use, and information sharing that preserve India’s freedom of action in crises.
5. Export acceleration: Use the partnership to develop Indian systems for third-country markets, turning collaboration into a vehicle for defence exports rather than import substitution.
6. Civil-military R&D hubs: Invest in centres that bring academic, private and public sectors together, ensuring that absorbed technologies diffuse into a broader industrial ecosystem.

Partnership as enrichment, not enclosure

A decade of deeper India–U.S. defence cooperation is an opportunity to move the needle on Indian capability. But cooperation must be designed with the explicit objective of strengthening autonomy — not diluting it. That requires legal foresight, industrial realism, financial imagination and diplomatic prudence.

In strategic affairs, the easiest mistake is to confuse proximity with control. India’s task is the opposite: to use proximity to gain control — of capability, of choice, and ultimately of its own destiny.

“A strong partnership is one that expands the room to choose; anything less is a gilded constraint.”