Trump, BRICS and the Flawed Premise of Decline

(A counter to an article in The Statesman)

By Sanjeev Oak

The Statesman recently argued that Donald Trump’s return spells doom for BRICS. This counter-view contends the opposite: Trump’s transactional economics may inadvertently fuel BRICS’ consolidation, testing America’s leverage while pushing emerging economies toward deeper South-South cooperation.

In a recent piece in The Statesman titled “Trump vs BRICS”, the argument was advanced that the return of Donald Trump to the White House spells renewed turbulence for the global order, with the BRICS bloc rising as a counterweight to an allegedly faltering United States. This framing, though rhetorically powerful, suffers from selective interpretation of economic data, misreads American resilience, and overestimates BRICS’ cohesion.

The truth is more nuanced: Trump’s presidency is set against the backdrop of a United States that remains the world’s largest economy, military power, and innovation hub. Meanwhile, BRICS, despite its ambitions, faces severe structural contradictions. Far from heralding the “end of Western dominance,” the current dynamics suggest a more complex multipolarity—where BRICS’ expansion remains aspirational, while U.S. economic fundamentals still anchor the global system.

The Statesman’s Argument—And Its Gaps

The Statesman article makes three core claims:

1. Trump’s policies will destabilize global trade and accelerate multipolarity.
2. BRICS, with its expanding membership and push for de-dollarisation, represents a credible counter to U.S.-led global institutions.
3. The U.S. is in structural decline, while BRICS countries are ascendant.

On the surface, these claims seem persuasive. Yet, each rests on shaky ground when tested against hard data.

The Dollar Is Not Going Anywhere

The Statesman piece highlights BRICS’ efforts to settle trade in local currencies and to reduce dependence on the U.S. dollar. But the reality is stark: nearly 60% of global forex reserves remain in dollars, compared to less than 5% in yuan. Over 88% of global foreign exchange transactions involve the dollar, and more than 40% of international debt is dollar-denominated.

BRICS members themselves are far from aligned on this issue. India has resisted the idea of a common BRICS currency, citing sovereignty and monetary stability. Brazil continues to peg its trade heavily to the dollar. Even Russia and China—leading the de-dollarisation chorus—settle significant transactions in dollars and euros because their currencies lack global convertibility.

As one IMF working paper noted recently, “network effects” keep the dollar dominant: businesses, banks, and governments use it because everyone else does. De-dollarisation may make headlines, but the dollar’s dominance is underwritten by deep, liquid U.S. financial markets that no BRICS member can replicate.

The Myth of U.S. Decline

The most glaring weakness in The Statesman’s framing is the assumption that America is in irreversible decline. Consider the numbers:

• GDP: The U.S. economy grew at 3.1% in 2023, outpacing most advanced economies. At nearly $28 trillion, it remains 40% larger than China’s GDP.
• Innovation: The U.S. hosts seven of the world’s top 10 technology firms, dominates AI research, and accounts for 50% of global venture capital investment.
• Energy: America is now the world’s largest producer of both oil and natural gas, reducing vulnerability to external shocks.
• Military Power: U.S. defense spending stands at $877 billion (2023), more than the combined defense budgets of the next 10 countries—including China, Russia, and India.

This is not a portrait of decline. It is the profile of a state that—despite political churn—remains the central pillar of the global order.

BRICS’ Structural Contradictions

By contrast, the BRICS bloc faces deep fissures:

• China-India Rivalry: India and China are locked in a tense border standoff; their strategic mistrust undermines BRICS’ unity.
• Economic Divergence: China’s GDP is nearly five times larger than the combined GDP of Brazil, South Africa, and Russia. Far from “equal partners,” BRICS risks becoming a China-centric vehicle.
• Internal Fragility: Brazil is struggling with inflationary pressures; South Africa faces power crises; Russia is crippled by sanctions.

Even the much-celebrated expansion of BRICS to include countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Egypt raises questions. These states have divergent foreign policy priorities—Riyadh’s alignment with Washington on security, Tehran’s hostility to the West, and Egypt’s dependence on IMF support. To call this a coherent bloc is to ignore the messy realities.

Trump and Trade: A Double-Edged Sword

The Statesman portrayal of Trump as a destabiliser of global trade is partly true—but incomplete. His “America First” rhetoric, tariff measures, and tough stance on China do unsettle global markets. Yet, one must ask: who benefits?

For many U.S. allies and even rivals, Trump’s transactionalism creates opportunities. India, for instance, saw record trade with the U.S. during Trump’s first term, surpassing $160 billion. Vietnam, Mexico, and others have gained manufacturing investment as companies hedge against China. Trump’s hard line on Beijing may fragment global supply chains, but it also accelerates a rebalancing that benefits middle powers.

Moreover, Trump’s domestic agenda—tax reforms, deregulation, and reshoring incentives—has boosted U.S. manufacturing output, which expanded by 12% between 2017–2021. These are not signs of economic erosion; they are evidence of recalibration.

BRICS and the Mirage of Multipolarity

Multipolarity is the catchphrase of the moment, and BRICS is often invoked as its vanguard. But multipolarity is not achieved by adding members or holding summits; it is achieved by creating durable institutions, credible currencies, and shared security frameworks. On these counts, BRICS remains weak.

The New Development Bank, BRICS’ flagship financial institution, has lent less than $40 billion since inception—a fraction compared to the World Bank’s $100 billion annual commitments. BRICS’ own members often borrow from the IMF and World Bank when in crisis—Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa being prime examples.

As one South African economist quipped: “BRICS is a cocktail party, not a currency union.”

Why India Should Be Cautious

For India, the stakes are particularly high. While BRICS offers a platform to voice Global South concerns, New Delhi cannot afford to be subsumed into a China-led economic bloc. With U.S.-India trade hitting $200 billion in 2024 and American FDI flows exceeding those from BRICS partners, India’s material interests are clear.

The Statesman article glosses over this: India’s strategic calculus lies in balancing, not bandwagoning. The Indo-Pacific Quad, critical defense agreements with Washington, and growing technology ties signal where New Delhi sees long-term value.

Power Lies in Resilience, Not Rhetoric

The narrative advanced in The Statesman—that Trump accelerates U.S. decline while BRICS rises as a counterweight—is not borne out by facts. U.S. dominance rests on hard economic and military foundations; BRICS, by contrast, is a patchwork of mismatched economies with clashing interests.

The real story is not “Trump vs BRICS,” but resilient America vs an aspirational but divided bloc. Multipolarity may well be the future, but its contours will be shaped less by BRICS declarations and more by how states like India, the EU, and ASEAN navigate between Washington and Beijing.

As the dust settles on Trump’s renewed presidency, one lesson is clear: writing America off has been a favourite pastime for decades. Yet, each time, the U.S. reinvents itself, while its rivals wrestle with contradictions. BRICS may expand, but expansion without integration is just noise.