
USA Out, China In: The Geopolitics of India–China Border Talks
By Sanjeev Oak
At its core, the move is not merely about maps and markers. It signals a recalibration of India’s strategic options—an acknowledgment that resolving border tensions with Beijing could, at least temporarily, reduce military friction and free up diplomatic bandwidth. Yet, this development also highlights a broader shift: “USA out, China in”, as the gravitational pull of regional power tilts away from Washington’s orbit.
The Long Shadow of 1962
India and China share a 3,488-kilometre-long disputed boundary, stretching from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh. Decades of negotiations, starting with the Joint Working Group set up in 1988, have yielded little beyond incremental confidence-building measures. The scars of the 1962 war still haunt the relationship, while periodic flare-ups—from the Doklam standoff (2017) to the Galwan clash (2020)—have kept the border a live wire.
For New Delhi, the costs of this unsettled frontier are immense. According to defence estimates, nearly 50% of India’s 1.4 million active military personnel are deployed along the northern and eastern borders, draining resources and limiting strategic flexibility. Annual border infrastructure spending has tripled in the last decade, crossing ₹12,000 crore in 2023-24.
“Border peace with China is not just a territorial issue—it is an economic and strategic necessity.”
Why Now?
The decision to revisit delimitation is not occurring in a vacuum. It follows two parallel developments.
First, India has maintained a delicate balancing act in its foreign policy: deepening ties with the United States through the Quad and defence cooperation, while refusing to sever links with Russia and continuing trade with China despite tensions. However, Washington’s credibility in Asia has been dented—first by its chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, and more recently by its inability to shape outcomes in the Ukraine war.
Second, China, despite slowing economic growth, continues to project itself as the indispensable regional actor. By engaging India directly in delimitation talks, Beijing seeks to bypass Western mediation and reassert the bilateral framework as the sole path to peace.
The Economic Subtext
Even amid political hostility, India–China trade reached $136 billion in 2024, with India importing $101 billion worth of Chinese goods, including critical electronics and machinery. Efforts to reduce this dependence have been slow. For Beijing, securing border stability would ensure uninterrupted access to the Indian market; for New Delhi, lowering border tensions would allow focus on industrial growth and energy security.
In contrast, India–US trade, though growing, remains at $122 billion (2024) and is dominated by services rather than critical supply chains. This economic calculus suggests that pragmatism, not ideology, is driving India’s engagement with Beijing.
“For India, China is both the biggest rival and the biggest trading partner—an irony that shapes every diplomatic move.”
Washington’s Waning Grip
The “USA out” element lies not in a dramatic rupture with Washington, but in a relative decline of American leverage. Successive US administrations have pressed India to harden its stance against Beijing, from restricting Chinese tech firms to joining Indo-Pacific military exercises. Yet, New Delhi has consistently charted an independent course.
India refused to join sanctions against Russia despite US pressure, continued to buy discounted Russian oil, and is now signaling willingness to explore a pragmatic border settlement with China. These moves underscore a reality: while Washington remains a valuable partner, India will not mortgage its strategic autonomy to American expectations.
Risks and Rewards
The delimitation exercise, if successful, could transform regional security. Reducing the likelihood of border skirmishes would allow India to divert resources towards maritime challenges in the Indian Ocean, where China’s presence is growing. It would also enhance India’s credibility as a power capable of managing its disputes without Western tutelage.
However, the risks are real. Beijing has a record of using negotiations tactically, offering temporary de-escalation while consolidating positions on the ground. A hasty settlement could compromise India’s territorial claims, particularly in sensitive sectors like Arunachal Pradesh. Moreover, leaning towards China could create unease in Washington at a time when defence technology cooperation is at a high point.
The Road Ahead
Delimitation is a painstaking process, involving surveys, exchanges of maps, and political concessions. Even if talks advance, a final border settlement may take years. But the symbolism of restarting the process cannot be ignored: it signals that India is willing to engage China directly, without American mediation, in shaping the Asian order.
The coming months will test whether this is a tactical maneuver or a strategic shift. Much depends on whether Beijing is serious about compromise or merely seeking to neutralize India’s alignment with the West.
“USA out, China in? Perhaps the real story is India in—an India determined to script its own destiny.”
India’s decision to resume delimitation talks with China reflects both strategic pragmatism and geopolitical recalibration. While the United States remains an important partner, the centre of gravity in Asia is shifting. For New Delhi, balancing rivalry and cooperation with Beijing may be the most challenging—and consequential—diplomatic act of the decade.