Handshakes, Hugs and Hard Power: Modi–Putin, SCO, and the Shifting Geometry of Global Alliances

By Sanjeev Oak

At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit, the warmth of Prime Minister Modi’s embrace with Vladimir Putin went beyond optics. It symbolised a recalibrated Eurasian diplomacy where India balances West–Russia tensions while deepening strategic stakes in the SCO and BRICS.

The image was carefully choreographed, yet strikingly genuine: Prime Minister Narendra Modi clasping Vladimir Putin’s hand and embracing him warmly before the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Astana. It was more than a greeting. It was a statement.

In a world fractured by sanctions, wars, and realignments, the Modi–Putin hug signals that New Delhi will not be confined within the binaries of “West versus Rest.” India is scripting its own vocabulary of diplomacy—rooted in historical partnerships, yet calibrated to the imperatives of a multipolar order.

“Always a delight to meet my friend Putin,” Modi’s own words cut through the noise, underscoring a relationship that has been tested over seven decades and continues to reinvent itself in the age of shifting power blocs.

A Legacy Forged in Steel and Strategy

India–Russia ties are not built on the scaffolding of the moment. They rest on a legacy that goes back to the Cold War era, when Moscow stood firmly by New Delhi at times of existential crises. From vetoes in the United Nations Security Council during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, to generous terms of defense cooperation, the Soviet Union was India’s most reliable strategic partner.

That trust translated into hard numbers. Even today, about 65–70% of India’s military equipment is of Soviet or Russian origin. The inventory stretches from MiG fighter jets and T-90 tanks to the S-400 Triumf missile defense system and nuclear-powered submarines. According to SIPRI estimates, between 2018 and 2022, Russia accounted for 45% of India’s arms imports—despite India’s diversification drive and U.S. sanctions under CAATSA.

The partnership has not been static. Joint ventures like BrahMos Aerospace, producing one of the world’s fastest supersonic cruise missiles, symbolize a rare co-production model between two major powers. Energy cooperation—ranging from crude oil supplies to nuclear reactors in Kudankulam—adds depth to the relationship.

The SCO Stage: Beyond Optics

The Astana SCO summit was more than a backdrop. For India, SCO membership offers a platform to engage a bloc that brings together Russia, China, Central Asia, Pakistan, and Iran. Unlike Western institutions, SCO is not bound by liberal norms but by pragmatism—security, counter-terrorism, and economic cooperation.

Critics dismiss SCO as “China–Russia dominated,” yet for India, its utility lies in three dimensions:

1. Counterbalance to China: Sitting across the table from Beijing in a structured format helps manage rivalry while signaling India’s unwillingness to cede the Eurasian space.
2. Access to Central Asia: Energy-rich and strategically located, Central Asia is crucial for India’s energy diversification and connectivity goals. SCO is the only multilateral forum where all regional stakeholders converge.
3. Counterterrorism Dialogue: Through its Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), SCO provides a mechanism to address extremism and terrorism—issues that directly affect India via Pakistan’s involvement.

For Putin, SCO is a lifeline. It projects Russia as a central node in non-Western groupings, countering Western sanctions and diplomatic isolation after Ukraine. Modi’s presence and warmth in this forum legitimise that claim while protecting India’s interests.

Between Washington and Moscow: The Balancing Act

India’s embrace of Putin comes at a delicate moment. The U.S. has tightened sanctions on Russia, NATO’s eastern flank is militarised, and Western capitals increasingly view any closeness with Moscow as complicity. Yet New Delhi cannot afford estrangement.

India’s strategic autonomy rests on balancing its Quad commitments with its Eurasian partnerships. Washington may be India’s partner in high-technology defense, AI, and semiconductors. But Russia remains its primary supplier of spare parts, legacy platforms, and discounted crude oil.

Oil imports tell the story. Since 2022, India has emerged as one of the largest buyers of Russian crude, often at discounted rates, cushioning its inflation and energy bills. This economic pragmatism is wrapped in strategic necessity: no other supplier could have replaced Russian barrels at such speed and scale.

“India cannot be asked to choose between its historical partner and its emerging ally. Its foreign policy thrives on multi-alignment, not entrapment.”

BRICS and the Geometry of Multipolarity

The SCO summit cannot be divorced from another grouping—BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and new entrants like Egypt and Saudi Arabia). If SCO anchors Eurasia’s security architecture, BRICS aspires to shape the economic order.

Russia sees BRICS as a counterweight to the G7. India, too, values BRICS for its New Development Bank and as a platform to amplify the Global South’s concerns on trade, climate, and reform of multilateral institutions. Yet the India–China contradiction shadows both SCO and BRICS.

The challenge for New Delhi is clear: How to leverage these platforms without being subsumed under China’s orbit? Here, the Modi–Putin bonhomie plays a subtle role. By keeping Russia close, India ensures Moscow is not entirely dependent on Beijing. A Moscow that listens to New Delhi—even partially—is a hedge against a fully China-centric Eurasia.

Defense Trade: Numbers that Matter

India–Russia defense cooperation is a story of resilience in numbers:

• Over $14 billion worth of defense equipment delivered to India in the last five years.
• Production of 700,000 Kalashnikov AK-203 rifles in Amethi, Uttar Pradesh, under joint venture agreements.
• Leasing of nuclear-powered submarines like INS Chakra—no other country except Russia has shared such technology with India.
• S-400 missile systems, despite U.S. pressure, have begun induction into Indian air defense.

These numbers do not just reflect contracts. They are strategic enablers. Russia’s willingness to transfer sensitive technologies contrasts with the West’s guarded approach. This is why even as India diversifies with France, Israel, and the U.S., Russia remains irreplaceable in certain niches.

Reading the Hug

In diplomacy, gestures often speak louder than communiqués. The Modi–Putin hug in Astana was carefully watched in Washington, Brussels, and Beijing. To some, it was optics; to others, it was defiance. But for India, it was affirmation.

Affirmation that its foreign policy will remain guided by national interest, not external pressure. Affirmation that in a fractured world, India will speak to all, trade with all, and embrace only the path that enhances its sovereignty.

“India’s handshake with Russia is not a rejection of the West—it is a reminder that multipolarity is not a slogan but a practice.”

The Road Ahead

As SCO evolves and BRICS expands, the strategic chessboard is becoming more complex. India’s choices will be tested: Can it deepen Quad ties without alienating Moscow? Can it engage in SCO without conceding ground to Beijing? Can it push BRICS toward genuine reform while resisting China’s overreach?

The answers will not lie in communiqués alone but in the choreography of handshakes and hugs, the hard arithmetic of defense trade, and the subtle art of strategic balancing.

In Astana, Modi and Putin reminded the world that history matters, geography binds, and pragmatism drives. As India rises, its challenge will be to convert these embraces into enduring leverage—ensuring that New Delhi remains not a bystander but a shaper of the emerging order.