Not a Triangle of Trouble, but a Mirror to U.S. Anxiety
By Sanjeev Oak
When Peter Navarro dismisses the Modi–Putin–Xi engagement at the SCO as “troublesome,” he betrays less an analysis of geopolitics and more a symptom of Washington’s unease at losing its monopoly on shaping global alignments.
Washington’s critics have seen this movie before. Whenever powers beyond the U.S.–Europe axis try to shape the world order, Washington reflexively brands it “troublesome.” Bandung in 1955 was dismissed as irrelevant by the U.S. establishment. Non-Aligned Movement summits were caricatured as talk shops. The BRICS initiative was long mocked before it began building financial institutions to rival the IMF and World Bank.
Navarro’s anxiety is not about Moscow, Beijing, or even New Delhi—it is about the slow erosion of a system where the United States dictates the terms of engagement.
“Whenever others gather without Washington, the script is predictable: suspicion, derision, and lectures.”
The SCO as a counter-narrative
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) was born as a Eurasian security grouping, but its evolution into an energy, trade, and technology dialogue platform directly challenges the American model of bilateral patronage. For India, the SCO is not about ideology; it is about geography and connectivity—Central Asia’s energy grids, Eurasian transit corridors, and a market that America cannot physically anchor itself into.
Navarro’s sneer at the Modi–Putin–Xi meeting fails to acknowledge that the SCO is no longer a marginal club—it represents nearly half the world’s population and a growing share of its GDP.
“To call half the planet ‘troublesome’ is less analysis, more insecurity.”
Double standards in Washington’s critique
Navarro frames Eurasian engagement as “profiteering” or “problematic.” Yet the United States signs oil deals with Saudi Arabia despite human rights concerns, courts Vietnam despite war memories, and woos Africa for rare earths.
If Washington reserves the right to balance pragmatism with principle, why should India be judged differently?
“American diplomacy cloaks profit in principle, but calls others’ pragmatism ‘profiteering.’”
India’s autonomy, not America’s anxiety
For New Delhi, the meeting with Putin and Xi was neither an embrace of China nor a rebuke to the United States. It was an assertion that India will talk to all, balance all, and build leverage everywhere.
The very premise of “with us or against us” belongs to a bygone Cold War. Today’s India is too large, too integrated, and too confident to be slotted into Washington’s binaries.
The historical echo
Indira Gandhi’s Moscow axis, Vajpayee’s Washington opening, and Modi’s Eurasian pivot are not contradictions—they are continuities of Indian diplomacy that refuses to mortgage sovereignty. To call that troublesome is to misunderstand India’s DNA.
The Modi–Putin–Xi triangle is not an alternative to the U.S. It is a reminder that no single power gets to police the chessboard.
The real trouble lies elsewhere
Washington should look inward. The “America First” trade wars, the weaponisation of the dollar, and the selective sanctioning of rivals have already alienated allies. If Navarro sees “trouble” in Eurasia, it is because U.S. unilateralism has created space for multipolarity.
The Modi–Putin–Xi meeting was not a challenge to America. But Washington’s insecurity might just turn it into one.