Modi–Putin–Xi: Reimagining a Triangle in the Long Arc of Indian Diplomacy

By Sanjeev Oak

In Tianjin, as Modi, Putin, and Xi share a rare triangular stage, the encounter transcends summit optics. It echoes Bandung’s diplomacy, Indira–Brezhnev’s axis, and Vajpayee’s balancing act, marking another historical turn in India’s search for strategic autonomy amid shifting global currents.

When Prime Minister Narendra Modi appeared in Tianjin with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, the cameras clicked for the optics. But the moment was not merely ceremonial. It was the revival of an idea with deep historical echoes: that India, Russia, and China — once imagined as a “strategic triangle” — might recalibrate the balance of global power.

What Yevgeny Primakov proposed in 1998 as a counter to U.S. unipolarity found its most symbolic stage two decades later, with India neither turning its back on the West nor submitting to Beijing’s orbit. To grasp the significance, one must trace the lineage of India’s diplomatic posture — from Nehru’s non-alignment and Bandung diplomacy, through Indira Gandhi’s Moscow embrace, to Vajpayee’s balancing of Washington and Moscow — and finally to Modi’s craft of multi-alignment.

Bandung to Tianjin: Nehru’s Civilisational Voice

In 1955, Jawaharlal Nehru walked into the Bandung Conference alongside Zhou Enlai, Sukarno, Nasser, and Tito. The spirit was anti-colonial solidarity — an attempt to forge a third way beyond Cold War binaries. Nehru’s wager was that newly independent nations could speak in their own civilisational idiom, not merely as satellites of Washington or Moscow.

That Bandung moment resonates in Tianjin. Modi, like Nehru, is asserting that India need not choose sides in another polarised era — this time between a Washington rattled by tariffs and sanctions, and a Beijing-Moscow axis challenging Western institutions.

“From Bandung to Tianjin, India’s voice has sought not neutrality, but agency.”

Yet there is a key difference. Nehru’s moral diplomacy was often undercut by lack of material heft. Modi’s India, by contrast, comes with economic weight, military partnerships, and digital influence — tools Nehru could only dream of.

Indira and Brezhnev: Security Through Moscow

If Nehru built India’s diplomatic grammar, it was Indira Gandhi who learned to wield it with realpolitik. By 1971, with Washington tilting toward Pakistan and China, Indira cemented the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation with Leonid Brezhnev. That pact provided a strategic umbrella during the Bangladesh war, enabling India to intervene decisively despite U.S. hostility.

Indira’s alignment with Moscow was not ideological surrender. It was tactical necessity: India needed breathing space to secure its borders and project power in South Asia.

In Tianjin, echoes of that calculus surfaced again. Modi reaffirmed Russia as a “special and privileged partner” — even as he pressed Putin on Ukraine. The line is familiar: maintaining Moscow as a dependable friend without being dragged into its conflicts.

“Indira embraced Moscow for survival; Modi engages Moscow for leverage.”

The Galwan Shadow and the China Puzzle

India’s China dilemma has never vanished. From the trauma of 1962 to the bloody skirmish in Galwan in 2020, distrust has remained constant. Yet pragmatism has also defined the relationship: from Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 Beijing visit to Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s 2003 border-management framework, India has repeatedly compartmentalised conflict and cooperation.

At Tianjin, Modi and Xi declared India and China to be “development partners, not rivals.” The phrase does not erase Galwan; it does not redraw the border. But it reframes the relationship in manageable terms, echoing Rajiv’s and Vajpayee’s instinct that peace, however fragile, is a prerequisite for development.

“India does not forget Galwan, but it does not freeze diplomacy either.”

Vajpayee’s Balance: Washington, Moscow, Beijing

Few leaders embodied balancing better than Vajpayee. In 1998, after the Pokhran nuclear tests, India faced U.S. sanctions. Yet Vajpayee wrote to President Bill Clinton, justifying the tests by citing the China threat. Within two years, he hosted Clinton in Delhi, opening a new chapter in Indo-U.S. ties.

At the same time, Vajpayee maintained robust defence ties with Moscow and signed agreements with Beijing to stabilise the border. His genius lay in weaving contradictions into coherence — engaging all three simultaneously, without surrendering autonomy.

Modi’s trilateral moment in Tianjin can be read as an extension of Vajpayee’s template: hug Putin, shake hands with Xi, negotiate with Washington. Balance is not a weakness; it is a tradition.

Primakov’s Triangle: From Theory to Theatre

When Yevgeny Primakov floated the Russia–India–China triangle in the late 1990s, the world was unipolar, with the U.S. striding unchallenged. His idea never fully materialised, partly because Beijing and Delhi were still locked in suspicion, and partly because India was leaning Westward under economic liberalisation.

In 2025, the landscape is different. Washington is seen as unpredictable, tariffs and sanctions are back in play, and the Ukraine war has pushed Moscow closer to Beijing. The Modi–Putin–Xi meeting is therefore not a resurrection of an anti-West bloc, but a pragmatic recalibration. India stands in the middle — not endorsing Russia’s war, not succumbing to China’s orbit, and not abandoning Western partnerships either.

“The Tianjin triangle was not Primakov’s dream fulfilled — but his logic vindicated.”

The SCO Stage: Utility Over Unity

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is no stranger to contradictions. It hosts both India and Pakistan, China and Russia, Central Asia and now Iran. Its declarations of unity often mask internal fissures.

For India, however, the SCO offers utility. It provides a rare stage to engage China and Russia together, to talk counter-terrorism in a forum where Pakistan sits uncomfortably, and to project its sovereignty without Western mediation. Modi’s three-word formula — Security, Connectivity, Opportunity — was both vision and veiled critique.

“Connectivity with trust, not coercion,” was aimed squarely at Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. Security was a coded warning to Pakistan. Opportunity was India’s pitch as a growth partner.

The Washington Factor: Autonomy, Not Alignment

The timing of the Modi–Putin–Xi encounter was impossible to miss. As Washington slapped steep tariffs on Indian goods for continuing oil imports from Russia, Modi chose to be seen warmly with Putin and Xi.

This was not anti-Americanism. It was assertion. Just as in 1971 India tilted toward Moscow when Nixon tilted to Pakistan, and in 2005 India signed the nuclear deal with Washington while still buying Russian arms, today Delhi is reminding Washington that its options are broader than any single axis.

“India’s message to Washington: respect autonomy, not presume alignment.”

Optics and Symbolism: Narrative Power

Diplomacy is as much theatre as negotiation. In Tianjin, the optics mattered: Modi between Putin and Xi, an Asian tableau projecting civilisational confidence. At home, it reinforced the image of India as a global player, no longer spoken for but speaking for itself.

Just as Nehru’s Bandung presence projected moral leadership, and Indira’s Moscow treaty projected strategic audacity, Modi’s trilateral embrace projected narrative power. For 1.4 billion Indians, the image was reassurance: India is not isolated, nor intimidated.

From Bandung to Tianjin: The Continuum

Seen in historical sweep, the Modi–Putin–Xi encounter is not an aberration but a continuation.

• Nehru crafted the moral vocabulary of non-alignment.
• Indira converted it into strategic security with Moscow.
• Vajpayee refined it into balance between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing.
• Modi has turned it into multi-alignment, simultaneously engaging across divides.

“India’s foreign policy is not neutrality — it is layered autonomy.”

A Triangle, A Statement

The Tianjin moment will not redraw borders or end wars overnight. But it matters because it compresses decades of history into one frame: Bandung’s spirit, Indira’s realism, Vajpayee’s balance, and Modi’s multi-alignment.

In standing with Putin and Xi, Modi was not choosing sides. He was choosing India’s space. The space to engage adversaries without erasing differences, to stand with friends without endorsing every action, and to remind Washington that India’s sovereignty is not for barter.

“India is no longer reacting to history — it is rewriting it.”

The Modi–Putin–Xi triangle is not the end of non-alignment, nor the beginning of bloc politics. It is the grammar of a new diplomacy — India as playwright, not just participant, in the theatre of global power.