The Long Arc of Indian Diplomacy: From Bandung to the Modi–Putin–Xi Triangle

By Sanjeev Oak

Every decade tests India’s ability to balance between power blocs. From Nehru’s Bandung Conference to Indira’s Brezhnev axis, from Vajpayee’s Washington–Moscow manoeuvres to today’s Modi–Putin–Xi engagements, the story is one of continuity: India refusing to be dictated, preferring to script its own terms of engagement.

At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit, the warm embrace between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin, under the watchful eyes of Xi Jinping, generated headlines far beyond the Eurasian stage. For India, it was more than just optics. For Washington, it was a reminder that India remains steadfast in its pursuit of strategic autonomy, even in an age of bloc politics.

Predictably, the chorus of criticism from the West followed. The sharpest came from Peter Navarro, a Trump-era trade adviser, who dismissed the Modi–Putin meeting as “troublesome.” His framing was familiar — implying India should behave like an adjunct of U.S. policy rather than as a sovereign state with a long arc of independent diplomacy.

But history tells a different story. India has never been a camp follower. It has always been a camp-builder.

Bandung and the Birth of Non-Alignment

The roots go back to 1955, when Jawaharlal Nehru joined Sukarno, Nasser, Tito, and Zhou Enlai at Bandung in Indonesia. That conference gave shape to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), India’s first grand articulation of being neither Washington’s outpost nor Moscow’s proxy.

Nehru saw non-alignment not as passivity but as agency. In the thick of the Cold War, when the world was neatly divided into NATO and Warsaw Pact, India insisted on retaining manoeuvrability. The West derided it as fence-sitting; the Soviets called it naïve. Yet NAM gave the newly decolonised world a voice, ensuring that Afro-Asian nations were not reduced to pawns in superpower rivalry.

“India has never been a camp follower. It has always been a camp-builder.”

That spirit survives today in India’s engagements with Russia and China. The SCO may not be NAM, but the instinct behind India’s participation — creating options, not submitting to alignments — remains remarkably consistent.

Indira Gandhi and the Brezhnev Axis

Critics often argue that India’s non-alignment collapsed under Indira Gandhi, particularly after the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation. But the context matters. Faced with Nixon and Kissinger’s infamous “tilt” towards Pakistan during the Bangladesh Liberation War, Indira used Moscow’s embrace as strategic insurance.

The Indira–Brezhnev axis was not about dependence; it was about survival in a hostile international climate. It allowed India to checkmate both Washington and Beijing in South Asia, while simultaneously pressing forward with economic and military consolidation.

Just as Indira leveraged Moscow without surrendering sovereignty, Modi leverages partnerships today. His ability to maintain defence cooperation with Russia, deepen energy ties, and simultaneously negotiate pacts with the U.S. mirrors Indira’s balancing act.

Vajpayee’s Balancing Between Bush and Moscow

Fast forward to Atal Bihari Vajpayee. His tenure saw India conduct nuclear tests in 1998, prompting U.S. sanctions. Yet within a few years, Vajpayee had turned relations around, building the foundation for the India–U.S. strategic partnership with George W. Bush.

At the same time, Vajpayee did not abandon Moscow. The 2000 “Strategic Partnership” with Russia ensured that India’s defence and energy interests remained anchored. His genius lay in not treating U.S. and Russia as mutually exclusive.

“From Bandung to Bush, the Indian instinct has been clear: options, not obedience.”

Modi’s diplomacy fits in this continuum. Just as Vajpayee balanced Washington and Moscow, Modi today balances the U.S., Russia, and China — a far more complex triangle, but one navigated with the same doctrine of autonomy.

Modi–Putin–Xi: A 21st-Century Triangle

Today, the global order is fractured: U.S.–China rivalry intensifies, Russia has turned East after its Ukraine war isolation, and the Global South is reasserting itself. In this context, Modi’s ability to engage Putin warmly while keeping channels open with Xi — and still expanding ties with Biden’s America — is not duplicity. It is diplomatic dexterity.

India knows that Russia remains crucial for defence supplies, energy security, and Eurasian access. China is a rival, but also a trade partner whose containment cannot be outsourced to Washington. The U.S. is a partner of choice, but not a commander of India’s foreign policy.

The Modi–Putin–Xi triangle signals not submission to Eurasia, but assertion of India’s role as a swing power.

Why Washington Bristles

Navarro’s critique must be seen in light of Washington’s discomfort. The U.S. has long assumed that “shared values” and “shared interests” would lock India into the Western camp. But India has always made clear: convergence does not mean subservience.

When Nehru refused to send troops to the Korean War, Washington fumed. When Indira signed the 1971 treaty with Moscow, Nixon raged. When Vajpayee tested nukes, Clinton sanctioned. Yet each time, India survived — and eventually compelled Washington to engage on India’s terms.

Today, when Modi embraces Putin, Washington sees echoes of that history. The irritation is less about Russia, more about the refusal of India to be predictable in the Western script.

“Convergence does not mean subservience. That is the Indian lesson Washington forgets.”

The Global South Dimension

There is another layer. India’s Eurasian outreach resonates with the Global South’s mood. Just as Bandung once rallied postcolonial nations, forums like BRICS and SCO today reflect a search for alternatives to Western-dominated financial and security structures.

India may not fully endorse the China–Russia agenda within these blocs, but its presence ensures balance. Much like NAM, where India was the moderating voice between radicals and conservatives, today too it acts as the stabiliser in BRICS and SCO.

The Long Arc

Put together, the trajectory is clear:

• Bandung (1955): Non-alignment as voice of the decolonised.
• Indira–Brezhnev (1971): Tactical alignment to safeguard sovereignty.
• Vajpayee–Bush (2000s): Simultaneous engagement with U.S. and Russia.
• Modi–Putin–Xi (2025): Multi-vector diplomacy in a fragmented order.

Each phase was derided at the time. Each later vindicated.

Continuity, Not Contradiction

To see Modi’s handshake with Putin as “troublesome,” as Navarro does, is to miss the thread that runs through seven decades of Indian diplomacy. This is not an aberration; it is a continuation.

From Nehru to Modi, India’s instinct has been the same: resist external pressures, build multiple options, and assert independence in a world of blocs.

“The handshake at SCO was not the betrayal of an ally. It was the reaffirmation of a tradition.”

Washington may bristle. Beijing may calculate. Moscow may celebrate. But India’s approach remains steady: engage all, align with none, and remain the author of its own destiny.