Why India’s Russian Oil Imports Are Rising Despite New US Sanctions
By Sanjeev Oak
India’s Russian oil imports have risen to a five-month high despite fresh US sanctions, spotlighting New Delhi’s energy calculus. The decision reflects not defiance, but a pragmatic balancing of affordability, supply security and strategic autonomy in a fractured global energy order.
India’s crude oil imports from Russia climbed to a five-month high in November, even as the United States tightened sanctions on Moscow’s energy sector. The development has triggered familiar questions in Western capitals — and predictable binaries in public debate. Is India undermining sanctions? Is it risking diplomatic fallout? Or is this simply a case of economic realism prevailing over geopolitical signalling?
The short answer is this: India’s decision is not about defiance. It is about energy security in a fractured global order.
India is not resisting sanctions; it is resisting the idea that energy policy can be outsourced to geopolitics.
What do the latest numbers show?
According to data cited by international energy trackers, India’s Russian oil imports rose to around €2.6 billion in November — the highest level in five months. The rise came despite fresh US sanctions aimed at Russian producers, shippers and financial intermediaries involved in crude exports.
In volume terms, Russian crude continues to account for roughly a third of India’s total oil imports, a dramatic shift from pre-2022 levels when Russia barely figured in India’s energy mix. Overall crude imports have remained stable; the increase reflects substitution rather than expansion.
This matters because it shows continuity rather than escalation — India is not importing more oil, but sourcing it differently.
Why does India continue to buy Russian crude?
The primary reason is price. Russian oil is available at a discount compared to Middle Eastern grades. For an economy that imports over 85 per cent of its crude needs, even marginal price differences have macroeconomic consequences — affecting inflation, fiscal balances and household fuel costs.
Beyond price, diversification is itself a strategic objective. India’s energy security doctrine rests on avoiding over-dependence on any single region or supplier. Russian oil, in that sense, is not an outlier but a counterweight.
Energy affordability is not a geopolitical luxury; it is an economic necessity for a developing country.
How is India navigating sanctions risk?
India has been careful to avoid direct violations. It has largely adhered to the G7 price cap framework, restructured shipping and insurance arrangements, and diversified payment mechanisms. When specific Russian entities were sanctioned, private refiners adjusted sourcing, while state-owned refiners stepped in to maintain supply continuity.
This pattern reveals something important: sanctions today generate friction, not paralysis. Large economies with diversified capabilities can adapt faster than sanction regimes can escalate.
Sanctions raise costs, but they no longer dictate outcomes in a multipolar energy market.
What does this say about India’s strategic autonomy?
India’s position reflects an evolved version of strategic autonomy — less rhetorical, more transactional. New Delhi engages the US on defence and technology, partners Europe on trade and climate, competes with China, and trades with Russia — without collapsing these relationships into a single axis.
This is not fence-sitting. It is selective alignment based on issue-specific interests. In energy, India has decided that supply security and price stability outweigh reputational signalling.
Strategic autonomy today is not about neutrality; it is about choice.
Is India merely consuming Russian oil — or gaining leverage?
India is also a major refining hub. Discounted Russian crude is processed domestically and exported as refined products to global markets. This refining arbitrage improves India’s trade balance and cushions domestic fuel prices.
In effect, India is moving up the energy value chain — converting supply disruption elsewhere into economic advantage at home.
India is no longer just an energy consumer; it is becoming an energy intermediary.
What are the risks?
There are risks India acknowledges. Over-reliance on one supplier can create exposure. Sanctions can harden unpredictably. Diplomatic pressure can intensify. Shipping routes and insurance frameworks can shift.
But India’s policy choice suggests a hierarchy of risks. Diplomatic discomfort is manageable. Structural inflation and energy insecurity are not.
India is choosing which risks it can live with — and which it cannot.
Why does this matter beyond India?
India’s stance resonates across the Global South. Many developing economies face similar pressures: rising energy needs, limited fiscal space, and geopolitical expectations they did not design.
By prioritising domestic stability over external signalling, India is articulating a principle likely to gain traction: development imperatives are not secondary to great-power politics.
The bottom line
India’s rising Russian oil imports are not an act of geopolitical defiance, but of economic governance. In a world where energy markets, sanctions and diplomacy no longer move in unison, New Delhi has chosen pragmatism over posture.
The real story is not why India buys Russian oil, but why the world still expects energy choices to be moral performances rather than economic decisions.